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I. INTRODUCTION 
Hedge funds are currently all the rage.  Over the last seven years the hedge 
fund industry has averaged close to an eleven percent annual yield,1 as compared 
to the Standard & Poor’s (S & P) 3.30%.2  2007 was particularly impressive with 
the hedge fund industry yielding slightly over double the S & P’s return.3  Even in 
the current economic crisis hedge funds continue to outperform the S & P.4  These 
large returns led Linda Thomsen, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
                                                          
* J.D./M.B.A. 2009 Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law & Katz School of Business.  
B.A. 2006, University of Rochester.  E-mail:  Daniel.Etlinger@gmail.com  I would like to thank 
Professor Peter Oh from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for his comments and suggestions. 
1 Patrick Hosking, Hedge Fund Returns are ‘Vastly Overstated’, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 26, 2006, 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article735784.ece. 
2 S&P 500, STANDARD & POOR’S, Dec. 31, 2007, http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/ 
index/SP_500_Factsheet.pdf. 
3 Svea Herbst-Bayliss, Prominent Hedge Funds Nurse Heavy Losses in 2008, REUTERS, Jan. 23, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/fundsFundsNews/idUSN23863620080123. 
4 Gregory Zuckerman & Jenny Strasburg, For Many Hedge Funds, No Escape, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 
2009, at R7 (stating that through November 2008 hedge funds had lost 18% on average, whereas the S 
& P had lost nearly 38%).  See also Jenny Strasburg, Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, More 
Hedge Funds Expected to Succumb, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22-23, 2008, at B2 (predicting hedge fund assets 
to fall by as much as 50% from their peak). 
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(SEC) Director of the Division of Enforcement, to comment that “[t]hese days, the 
money is in hedge funds, so the potential for abuse, the potential for securities law 
violations is there because there is so much money there.”5 
There is indeed a lot of money in hedge funds, with over $2 trillion in 
assets,6 spread out over an estimated 10,000 hedge funds worldwide.7  Due to 
relatively low entry costs, aggressive strategies, leveraging and fierce competition 
hedge funds are continually being created and disassembled, causing a fluid 
number in the market.8  In fact, Credit Suisse predicts that as many as 30% of 
hedge funds will have to close due to the economy.9  Although hardly new,10 there 
is still no statutory definition for a hedge fund.11  A common description is “any 
pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional 
investment managers, and not widely available to the public.”12 
The controversies surrounding hedge funds have shaken public confidence 
and led to calls for increased regulation.13  These proposals, ranging from more 
informative online brochures,14 to hedge funds having to adopt Section 2(a)(41) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Act) (affecting how hedge funds 
would value securities),15 have not gone unopposed.  According to Philip 
Goldstein, a co-founder of Bulldog Investors (Bulldog – although there are several 
funds under Goldstein, they will collectively be referred to as Bulldog), 
“[r]egulatory agencies all the time are doing things that are beyond their authority.  
In this country, that’s a very scary thing, because they are not really accountable.  
                                                          
5 Hedge Funds and Wall St. Are Warned to Be Vigilant on Misdeeds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/business/14hedge.html. 
6 REPORT OF THE INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
MARKETS, PRINCIPALS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS, 1 (Apr. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/investors'committeereportapril152008.pdf 
[hereinafter Principals]. 
7 Houman Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation, REGULATION, Spring 2007, at 38. 
8 SEC, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS, 63 n.218  (1999), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter Implications] (“The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets 
report estimated that, based on a sample of 397 hedge funds from 1994 to 1998, the survival rate was 
less than 60 percent.”).  See also Anthony Hanlon, Proposals for Reform of Hedge Fund Regulation, 11 
(Apr. 24, 2002) (unpublished LL.M. written work requirement submission, Harvard Law School), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/tony_hanlon.pdf (highlighting the median 
age of hedge funds in 2002 was only 5.3 years). 
9  Gregory Zuckerman & Cassell Bryan-Low, More Pressure on Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
17, 2008 at C3. 
10 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 1 (Apr. 1999), http://www. 
ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgefund.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Funds] (identifying the first hedge 
fund as being created in 1949). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72054, 
72056 n.27 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275, 279) [hereinafter Registration] (“In a 
recent study, over fifty percent of respondents identified hedge funds as ‘most likely to be at the center 
of an investment controversy’ in the next five years.”). 
14 Judith Burns, SEC Dusts Off Online Plan For Brochures of Advisers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, 
at A14. 
15 Implications, supra note 8, at 99. 
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You’ve got to sue them!”16 
There have been two discrete rounds in the attempt to increase regulation of 
hedge funds that Goldstein has challenged.  The first involves Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), which provides hedge funds 
an exemption from registration if they have less than fifteen clients.17  In February 
of 2006, the SEC modified the definition of client from an entire fund counting as 
one client to a ‘look-through’ attitude that counts each investor in the fund 
separately.18  This change would require many hedge funds that were previously 
exempt to register with the SEC through the Advisers Act.19 
After several comment letters on the subject, Goldstein finally took the SEC 
to court.20  The SEC argued that the term “client” is not defined by the Advisers 
Act and thus is ambiguous.  Accordingly, the SEC maintained that they could 
reasonably interpret the provision as applying to hedge funds.21  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with Goldstein that the new 
definition runs counterintuitive to other sections of the Advisers Act and vacated 
the rule.22  The SEC subsequently announced that it would not challenge the 
decision; the hedge funds essentially earned a temporary truce.23 
That truce did not even last a year.  Since 1975, Congress introduced 
legislation requiring investment managers with at least $100,000,000 to file 
reports, under Rule 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 
that disclose certain security positions and their value.24  In 2006, two of 
Goldstein’s funds crossed this threshold and Goldstein filed a request for 
exemption from 13(f).25  When that request was denied, Goldstein filed suit 
claiming Bulldog will be monetarily hurt by 13(f) since the public could duplicate 
his positions.26  Essentially, Goldstein’s suit advances two arguments.  First, these 
reports would disclose trading strategies, and thus harm proprietary interests in the 
                                                          
16 Jonathan Shazar, Philip Goldstein: The Man Behind Bulldog, FINALTERNATIVES, Oct. 5, 2007, 
http://www.finalternatives.com/node/2595/. 
17 Dale Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 1, 8-9 (2006). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Letter from Philip Goldstein, President, Bulldog Investors, to Jonathan Katz, Secretary, 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 25, 2004). 
21 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878-84 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (relying on Chevron v. NRDC, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 
22 Id. (arguing the SEC’s definition ran counterintuitive to other provisions of the Advisers Act, the 
definition could result in conflicts of interest and the SEC was advocating changing the definition in 
some instances but using the old definition in others). 
23 Christopher Cox, STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COX CONCERNING THE DECISION OF THE U.S. 
COURT OF APPEALS IN PHILIP GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. V. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2006-2006-135.htm. 
24 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 78a. 
25 Karyn McCormack, Do Hedge Funds Hold ‘Trade Secrets’?, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 12, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/sep2006/pi20060913_356291.htm; see also Telis 
Demos, The Man Who Beat the SEC, FORTUNE, Jun. 18, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/06/06/ 
magazines/fortune/ Man_who_beat_SEC_Demos.fortune/index.htm (reporting that Bulldog now has 
over $500 million in assets and has yielded a 15% return over its lifetime). 
26 Dane Hamilton, Hedge Funds Take on SEC Over Disclosure Requirements, CNBC, May 17, 
2007, http://www.cnbc.com/id/18722751. 
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way that Coca-Cola’s Coke formula is a protectable asset.27  Second, the reports 
would disclose “unique intellectual property,” and thus violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s prohibition against taking private property without just 
compensation.28 
This Article critically evaluates these arguments before ultimately 
concluding that 13Fs are critical to monitoring the security markets and informing 
investors.  Part I reviews the construction and application of 13(f).  This part will 
first discuss the legislative history and intent behind Rule 13(f) before discussing 
how Congress, courts and the SEC have constructed 13(f).  Part II then provides a 
general overview of hedge funds and their peculiar position within the existing 
regulatory framework.  Part III explores a trade secret argument to 13(f).  Part IV 
examines a takings claim against application of 13(f).  And finally, Part V looks at 
related disclosure proposals.  Most proposals are not feasible in their current form 
due to costs or undue burdens on the hedge fund industry.  However, two proposals 
that make a strong case are creating a private market intermediary and changing 
the requirements for accredited natural persons. 
II. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF 13(f) 
A. Legislative History of Rule 13(f) 
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the Exchange Act were 
enacted to regulate the securities markets through disclosure.29  The Securities Act 
has two principal goals: 1) to protect investors through disclosure and 2) to outlaw 
fraud in the sale of securities.30  The Exchange Act explicitly seeks to promote 
efficiency in the markets and to protect interstate commerce, national credit, 
federal taxing power and the banking system.31  Taken together, these two acts add 
to the age-old adage of caveat emptor by “put[ting] the burden of telling the whole 
truth on the seller.”32 
In the 1960s, Congress became concerned about the growing influence of 
financial institutions on markets and considered amending the two acts.33  In 1968, 
Congress commissioned the SEC to study the markets and the new trends.34  Over 
the next three years the SEC utilized interviews, questionnaires, surveys and 
                                                          
27 Id.; see also Edward Pekarek, Hogging the Hedge? “Bulldog’s” 13F Theory May Not Be So 
Lucky, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1079, 1138 n.224 (2007) (“If you are arguing is it could be 
worse because you could have to publish every trade, I agree, but that’s like saying that Coca-Cola 
doesn’t have to publish its entire formula, but just maybe like thirty percent of all the ingredients, and 
that is not so bad.”) (quoting Philip Goldstein, President, Bulldog Investors, Morning Call: Hedge 
Funds Spill the Beans, CNBC (Dec. 12, 2006)). 
28 Hamilton, supra note 26. 
29 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a, 78a. 
30 Edward N. Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 6, 9 (1959). 
31 Id. 
32 H.R. REP. NO. 73-95, at 2 (1933) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt). 
33 Thomas Lemke & Gerald Lins, Disclosure of Equity Holdings by Institutional Investment 
Managers: An Analysis of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 43 BUS. LAW. 93, 98 
(1987). 
34 Id. 
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market portfolios to analyze various aspects of managers.35  The SEC looked at the 
number of managers, their size, growth, value of assets, fees and other relevant 
information.36 
In 1971, the SEC released their findings in its Institutional Study.37  Among 
the findings, the Institutional Study showed that managers had shifted their 
portfolios to give a higher weight to equities.38  In terms of negative or volatile 
swings in the market place, the Institutional Study found that “institutional trading 
overall has not impaired price stability in the markets.”39  However, the study did 
conclude there was a need for increased disclosure requirements.40  In particular, 
the Institutional Study noted: 
The past and likely future growth of institutional investors in the equity markets 
makes the collection of timely information about institutional holdings and activity 
in securities essential for an agency responsible for the administration of the federal 
securities laws . . . 
The importance of a regularized, uniform, and comprehensive scheme of 
institutional reporting cannot be minimized in light of the demonstrated growth of 
institutional investment and its impact on the structure of the securities markets, 
corporate issuers and individual investors.41 
Ultimately, based on their findings, the SEC formally recommended the 
Exchange Act be amended to include greater disclosure requirements.42  Several 
proposals were drafted and introduced until in 1975 Congress settled on one and 
amended the Exchange Act to include Rule 13.43 
Specifically, Rule 13(f) requires all investment managers (which can include 
hedge funds, banks, pension funds, non-profits and others) who hold certain types 
of publicly traded securities worth at least $100,000,000 to file a 13F report four 
times a year.44  Individuals are exempt from this reporting due to privacy 
considerations.45  In addition, the manager must utilize investment discretion over 
the accounts since the purpose is to record information on the activities and 
movements of the managers.46 
For each security listed, the report must include the title, class, CUSIP 
number (an identification number that facilitates the trading and clearing of 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Lemke, supra note 33, at 99. 
39 Id. (quoting Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, at XXI (1971)) 
[hereinafter Study Report]. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (quoting Study Report, supra note 39, at X). 
42 Id. 
43 Lemke, supra note 33, at 99-100 
44 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 13(f), 17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1 (referring to 13(f) as the 
Exchange Act rule, 13F denotes the actual form itself). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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securities), number of shares and aggregate fair market value.47  Fair market value 
indicates the value on the last trading day rounded to the nearest one thousand 
dollar.48  Transactions of $500,000 or more require additional disclosures that 
include the nature of the transaction, per share price, dates of the transaction, dates 
of the settlement, the broker and the market(s) in which the transaction was 
effected.49 
The main purpose of 13(f) is to gather and disseminate data about investment 
managers.  Congress specifically intended 13(f) to be a means for promptly 
providing this information to the public.50  A Senate report recommended 13(f) be 
used to promote informed investors, increase regulatory accountability and create 
an informational database for use in future reforms,51 all of which in turn would 
generate greater market confidence, induce future investors and facilitate tracking 
of data.52  The database also would allow a greater understanding of the security 
markets as well as their potential impact on banks, other markets and investors.53 
Notably, the Exchange Act does not contain language forcing firms to 
disclose information about their future positions.  Traditionally, the SEC has taken 
a conservative view on this issue due to the inherit speculative nature and potential 
to (unintentionally) mislead investors.54  According to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, “[o]rdinarily, the SEC and the courts discourage 
presentations of future earnings, appraised asset valuations and often hypothetical 
data in proxy materials.”55  Although the SEC has since relaxed their future 
disclosure rules somewhat they have never amended Rule 13(f) to require future 
disclosures.56 
B. Construction of Rule 13(f) 
The first source of guidance in the construction process is Congressional 
Reports.  The 1968 Senate report (conducting the research which lead to the 
promotion of Rule 13(f)) praised Rule 13(f) as capable of informing investors, 
increasing regulatory accountability and creating an informational database that 
could be used in the debate for future reforms.57  Acknowledging there might be 
some initial discomfort the report mentions: 
                                                          
47 Id. 
48 Lemke, supra note 33, at 110. 
49 17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1. 
50 Confidential Treatment Filer, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 643 (June 17, 
1998) [hereinafter Confidential Treatment Filer]. 
51 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 78 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256. 
52 Id. 
53 Id.; see also Implications, supra note 8, at 94 n.308. 
54 Kenneth Scott Fife, Comment, Mandatory Disclosures of Soft Information in the Market for 
Corporate Control, 35 EMORY L.J. 213, 215 (1986) (delineating general disclosure rules). 
55 Id. (quoting Kohn v. Am. Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 265 (3d Cir. 1972), overruled in 
part by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)). 
56 Id. at 217-18 (allowing forward-looking statements in certain scenarios as long as the statement 
“was (1) prepared with a reasonable basis and (2) disclosed in good faith.”). 
57 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 77-78 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 256. 
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[w]hile expanding the reporting burden for certain institutional investment 
managers may result in some initial expense to some investment managers, it is 
nevertheless clear that it is now appropriate to begin to accumulate such a body of 
data to permit reasoned discussion and decision about the influence and impact of 
the large institutional investment managers on the securities markets.58 
Furthermore, the report mentions that hampering a firm’s competitive edge is 
not a reason behind enacting the amendment.59  The report actually acknowledges 
“that generally it is in the public interest to grant confidential treatment to an 
ongoing investment strategy of an investment manager.  Disclosure of such 
strategy would impede competition and could cause increased volatility in the 
market place.”60 
One month later a House Conference Report addressed the same issues.61  A 
central message to the report is that “[t]he securities markets of the United States 
are indispensable to the growth and health of this country’s and the world’s 
economy.”62  The report continued, stating that to remain competitive the 
American markets must remain efficient and operate fairly.63  Should the markets 
falter along these lines American markets will lose grounds to international 
financial centers (including growing international hedge fund centers include in 
Hong Kong, Singapore, UK and Germany).64  To help assure the efficiency of 
these markets the House supported Rule 13(f).65 
In 1983 a Report of the Staff of the SEC noted that “[a]lthough the 
Commission does not plan to make extensive use of information that could be 
gathered under Rule 13(f) at the present time, we do believe that disclosure of 
holdings of institutional managers is in the public interest for the reasons set forth 
in the Senate Report.”66  This suggests that in 1983 the SEC was still figuring out 
what exactly 13Fs can demonstrate and how best to utilize them.67  More recently, 
in 1998, a Commission Notice acknowledged that “Congress also recognized that, 
in some instances, disclosure of certain types of information could have harmful 
effects, not only on an investment manager, but also on the investors whose assets 
are under its management.”68  This implies Congress’ recognition that 13Fs at least 
have the potential to negatively impact the value of these portfolios.69 
                                                          
58 Id. at 85. 
59 Id. at 87. 
60 Id. 
61 H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 90-91 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 322. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Full Value Advisors, Application for Exemption from Rule 13f-1, File No. ------- , 14(Oct. 24, 
2006) [hereinafter Exemption] (quoting Report of the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
on the Operation of Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 17 (Nov. 29, 1983)) 
(emphasis added). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 19 n. 14 (quoting Commission Notice: Re: Section 13(f) Confidential Treatment Requests 
(June 17, 1998)). 
69 Id. 
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The second sources to examine are cases.  To prove a party is violating the 
Exchange Act, willfully or otherwise, it is not necessary to prove they had 
knowledge they were in fact violating it.70  Section 21(b) of the Exchange Act 
allows the SEC to issue cease and desist orders to an institution in violation of any 
of the Exchange Act’s rules.71  This also enables the SEC to require a firm come 
into compliance in the future and to correspond with the SEC on their efforts.72  
Fraudulent claims also fall under Rule 10(b)-5 of the Exchange Act stating that no 
“manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection with securities may be used, 
otherwise the SEC has the right to act to protect the public interest.73  Remedies 
available allow the SEC to investigate and to publish wrongdoings, judicial 
enforcement, sanctions, suspensions, and requiring compliance in the future.74 
For managers that comply with the Advisers Act there are further provisions 
to examine.75  Section 80b-3 gives the SEC authority to censure a firm, to limit a 
manager’s activities and to suspend or revoke registration for certain violations.76  
The first of these violations is filing any false report with the SEC; including 
13Fs.77  The Act expands this idea to say that the SEC can bring an action for any 
act by a manager to defraud a client.78  Section 80b-3e5 is even broader still, 
stating that the SEC can bring action for a violation of any provision of the 
Exchange Act.79 
The SEC only has a budget of $888 million (.035% of the United States’ 
total budget) and approximately 3,000 employees.80  In 2006, the SEC lost 155 
employees and their total cases dropped 9%.81  Despite these obstacles, since Rule 
13(f)’s enactment the SEC has exhibited an increased willingness to take formal 
actions.82  These actions fall into three distinct categories.  The first is a failure to 
report 13F forms altogether.83  The second is filing 13F reports past when they are 
due (which has happened only once).84  The third is filing fraudulent 13F forms.85 
In SEC v. Mogy, a Rule 13(f) issuer failed to file its required report for a 
significant amount of time.86  The court determined that the issuer had met all of 
                                                          
70 Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965). 
71 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.S. § 21(b). 
72 Id. 
73 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
74 15 U.S.C.S. § 78u. 
75 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-1. 
76 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e. 
77 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e1. 
78 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e6. 
79 15 U.S.C.S. § 80b-3e5. 
80 Carl J. Nelson, Note, Hedge Fund Regulation: A Proposal to Maintain Hedge Funds’ 
Effectiveness Without SEC Regulation, 2 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 221, 229-30 (2007). 
81 Id. at 230. 
82 S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 70-71(1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 248-49. 
83 17 C.F.R. rule 13f-1. . 
84 Id., see e.g., Paramount Capital Group, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 89,121 (June 27, 1989), 
available at http://sec.gov/news/digest/1989/dig062789.pdf (failing to file a timely 13F report caused 
Paramount to revise and then present policy modifications to prevent this from occurring again). 
85 Id. 
86 Joel R. Mogey Inv. Counsel, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 44,268, 74 SEC Docket 2007 (May 
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the requirements but failed to file a report for six years and therefore imposed a 
civil penalty of $25,000, as well as an order to file 13F reports.87  Similarly, in 
2007, Quattro Global Capital, LLC was forced to comply with Rule 13(f) and pay 
substantial civil penalties of $100,000.88  The increase in penalty was due to 
Quattro’s inclusion of 13F forms in its compliance manual, reminders by outside 
auditors and prompting by the SEC during the period in which they failed to 
report.89 
In Cabot Money Management, Inc., a Cabot director repeatedly praised one 
stock (Presstek) as “the best stock we have ever uncovered in our lifetime of 
searching for super-growth stocks” in their investment advisory letters.90  During 
this period Cabot met all of the Rule 13(f) requirements, but failed to file a 13F 
twice.91  Also during this period Presstek’s stock swung between $200 and $60.92  
Since Cabot failed to file 13Fs, and due to the severity in the swings of Presstek’s 
stock, the court ordered Cabot to file 13Fs in the future and to pay a penalty of 
$12,500.93 
There has been one case for filing false information in a 13F report.94  SEC v. 
Sacane is a civil action in which a private plaintiff sued Durus Capital 
Management, LLC, for alleged damages sustained from material omissions and 
misrepresentations within its 13F.95  The action was cogently based on a fraud-on-
the-market theory,96 but ultimately was dismissed for failure to plead a proper 
complaint.97  After the case, United States Attorney Kevin O’Connor stated in a 
press release:  
“It is our hope that this prosecution will send a message to hedge fund operators 
that the federal government is watching . . .  [T]he failure to obey securities laws, 
especially by making false statements in SEC filings on which investors rely, is a 
serious crime. Violators will be vigorously prosecuted.” 98 
These cases indicate the SEC’s willingness to monitor and to enforce 
                                                          
7, 2001).   
87 Id. 
88 Quattro Global Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 37,573, 62 SEC Docket 994 (Aug. 15, 
1996). 
89 Id. 
90 Cabot Money Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37,573, 62 SEC Docket 1562 (Aug. 15, 
1996).  
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Sacane, Civil Action No. 2:05cv1575-SRU (2005). 
95 Id. at 23 (filing that Durus owned 5,283,248 shares of Aksys stock, when in fact they owned 
over 10,000,000 shares resulting in the deflation of Aksys’ stock). 
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compliance with Rule 13(f).  However, since its inception there have been only 
five cases to reach this stage, a relatively small amount compared to the SEC’s 
overall caseload of defrauding clients.99  There were three cases for failure to file, 
one for filing late and one for a fraudulent filing.  This suggests that to a large 
extent firms are willing to comply with Rule 13(f)’s requirements. 
The third, and last, source that is of help is SEC Opinion Letters and 
Releases.  The SEC has also spent considerable time clarifying Rule 13(f) 
issues.100  One of these issues is how managers can exempt out of Rule 13(f).101  
The SEC has expressed its concerns that “many Form 13F filers have concluded 
that confidential treatment of information contained on Form 13F will be granted 
automatically upon a superficial showing of need.  Such a conclusion is 
erroneous.”102  The SEC instead has identified four major categories for 
confidentiality: 1) information that would identify securities held by a natural 
person, 2) revealing a strategy, 3) open risk arbitrage positions and 4) block 
positioning.103 
These four categories are similar in that they all require a showing of a 
specific, rather than general, strategy, as well as resulting harm in disclosure.  
These are just two of the steps the SEC looks for.104  Typically, exemptions are 
issued only if a manger demonstrates 1) a justification for the time period sought, 
2) a specific investment strategy, 3) the strategy is ongoing, 4) disclosure would 
reveal the strategy and 5) demonstrable harm from disclosure.105 
A second issue the SEC has spent time clarifying is issuers now filing 13F 
forms online via the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval 
system (EDGAR).106  This change follows the legislative intent to have a rapid 
dissemination of the information.107  Consistent with rule changes, the SEC 
solicited comments from individuals, companies and industry representatives 
affected by the change.108  Their names were not released, but six individuals 
suggested submitting 13F forms more frequently109 and the industry representative 
                                                          
99Registration, supra note 13, at 72,056 (during the period from 1999 to 2004 the SEC brought fifty-one 
cases against hedge fund managers for defrauded investors). 
100 Division of Investment Management: Frequently Asked Questions about Form 13F, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, May 2005, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
investments/13ffaq.htm [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. 
101 Confidential Treatment Filer, supra note 50, at 1-2. 
102 Id. 
103 Id.; see also Quarterly Filings, INVESTOR VILLAGE (2008), http://www.investorvillage.com/ 
smbd.asp?mb=3532&mn=14262&pt=msg&mid=4055080 (defining open risk arbitrage as a risk 
arbitrage position that will still exist when 13Fs are released which will effectively close the 
opportunity); see also Division of Market Regulation: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions 
Concerning Regulation SHO, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, July 2007, Question 4.7, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho1204.htm (defining block positioning 
as holding a group of stocks together that need to be sold rapidly under certain circumstances). 
104 Id. at 3-4. 
105 Id. 
106 Rulemaking for EDGAR System, Exchange Act Release No. 40,934, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 23,640, 68 SEC Docket 2814 (Jan. 12, 1999).  
107 Id. at 2. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 5 (stressing one commenter actually suggests filing the form within five days at the end of 
every month). 
2008 THE CASE AGAINST HEDGE FUND DISCLOSURE 91  
 
stated the current time period remained appropriate.110  The SEC also encouraged 
comments addressing whether electronic filing of 13Fs would have an adverse 
effect upon competition, but did not receive any letters on this point.111  These 
letters suggests the industry as a whole accepted the Rule 13(f) requirements.112 
III. THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY 
A. Definition 
Although hedge funds avoid statutory definition they can be identified by 
meeting several key features.  The first is that they are investment managers not 
marketed to the general public.113  Second, investors are limited to high net worth 
individuals and institutions.114  Third, hedge funds are not registered as an 
investment company under the Investment Act or similar regulations.115  Fourth, a 
hedge fund’s assets are managed by an investment manager whose gains in part 
rely on the performance of the portfolio.116  And fifth, there is typically a lock-in 
period which restricts investor redemption rights.117 
Breaking down these five points will illuminate the nature of hedge funds 
further.  First, they are not marketed to the general public (largely in part since 
they are only offered to sophisticated investors).118  Under the Securities Act 
Regulation D Rule 506 hedge funds are prohibited from making general 
solicitations or general advertising.119  However, an important exemption to the 
rule allows hedge funds to market themselves to institutional investors, accredited 
investors or natural persons with a net worth over $1,000,000.120  They do so 
primarily by sending out targeted material and by cooperating with financial 
advisers who make recommendations to sophisticated investors where they should 
invest.  A hedge fund will stress to this segment a high rate of return, steady 
performance, unique strategies and other strengths they possess to gain their 
business.121 
The second premise, only sophisticated investors can invest, is the lynchpin 
behind hedge funds.  In theory, sophisticated investors understand investment risks 
and therefore are well equipped to deal with the aggressive, less disclosed 
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strategies hedge funds employ.  By limiting themselves to only sophisticated 
investors this allows hedge funds to exempt out of many regulations, their third 
premise. 
The third characteristic of hedge funds is that they are exempt from many 
registration requirements.122  Hedge funds are exempt from many of the reporting 
obligations of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.123  Furthermore, hedge 
funds are exempt from the registration requirements of the Investment Act and the 
Advisers Act.124  Despite this, many hedge funds will voluntarily register with an 
agency.125  In 2006, roughly 86% of hedge funds had voluntarily registered with 
some regulatory agency.126  Hedge funds voluntarily register for several reasons, 
including a need to establish legitimacy, to attract capital from certain markets (by 
giving assurances to investors) and to establish a rapport with regulatory bodies.127 
The essence of a hedge fund is the same as any investment manager.  They 
monitor markets and trends and make educated predictions on where best to invest 
money.128  These investments yield returns with which the hedge funds, in part, 
make their profits off of.129  To effectuate their trades hedge funds interact with a 
number of different partners.130  Counterparties, including banks and broker-
dealers, take the other side of a hedge fund position.131  Broker-dealers and future 
broker-dealers help consolidate and clear trades for the hedge fund.132 
Lastly, since hedge funds can employ long term strategies that require a 
minimal amount of capital in the pool to work, they employ lock-in strategies.133  
A typical lock-in period is from one to three years,134 and varies in how severe an 
investor’s redemption rights are (only a few restrict an investor from pulling out 
any money from the fund, most restrict the amount to a low percentage).135  Hedge 
funds often buckle under when their lock-in periods are not sufficient and panic 
strikes their investors.136  Some hedge funds are pushing back and installing longer 
“lock-in” periods.137  Due to the 2008 credit crunch, along with tighter lending 
policies and heavy losses from mortgage securities, hedge funds are seeking longer 
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lock-ins to stabilize their funds.138 
To better understand the definition of hedge funds still one might compare 
them to other pooled investment vehicles, the first of which are registered 
investment companies.  Registered investment companies have a number of 
similarities to hedge funds that causes investors to mistakenly take them for one.139  
Both engage in holding and investing pools of securities through a professional 
asset manager, who can follow similar investment strategies and investment 
vehicles.140 
However, registered investment companies register under the Investment 
Act, the Securities Act and the Advisers Act and are subject to their disclosure and 
reporting requirements.141  These differences manifest into greater transparency, 
public solicitation, and eventual acceptance of unsophisticated investors, governing 
board of directors and other structural changes.142  Registration also affects the 
company operationally and can limit their choice of strategies, issues with 
leveraging and investment vehicles.143 
A second comparison can be made to private equity funds.  Private equity 
funds, like hedge funds, are a type of unregistered investment strategy.144  Since 
they are unregistered they cannot solicit to the general population and generally 
attract high net worth individuals and institutions.145  In addition, private equity 
funds follow the legal formula for incorporation as a limited liability company 
(LLC) or limited partnership (LP) and utilize the master-feeder structure like hedge 
funds do.146 
But, however, private equity funds differ from hedge funds in several 
material ways.  Private equity funds investors agree to invest their capital over the 
life of the fund at staggered intervals.147  These intervals are not necessarily 
predetermined and can be induced by “capital calls” on the part of the fund.148  
Redemption rights also differ.  Typically the fund is established with long-term 
goals and redemption before its contractual conclusion can be difficult.149 
One last assessment can be made with venture capital funds.  Venture capital 
funds have similar elements to hedge funds that mirror private equity funds’ 
commonalities.150  Venture capital funds are unregistered, structurally similar, 
attract similar investors and have mandatory capital contributions over a staggered 
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period.151  An additional similarity is that they will often have a controlling 
influence (such as sitting on the board of directors) over the companies they invest 
in.152 
In contrast, venture capital funds almost exclusively look to invest in 
companies who are in their start-up or infant stages.153  Venture capital funds also 
seek to liquidate their positions as soon as they make a suitable profit on their 
investment.154  Hedge funds, on the other hand, may hold onto these positions long 
afterwards based on their portfolio needs (such as making sure they have at least 
one highly liquid position).155 
B. Performance 
Although hedge funds command roughly $2 trillion in assets this is still a 
relatively small amount compared to other sectors of the financial market.156  
Heading into the new millennium “commercial banks had $4.1 trillion in total 
assets; mutual funds had assets of approximately $5 trillion; private pension funds 
had $4.3 trillion; state and local retirement funds had $2.3 trillion; and insurance 
companies had assets of $3.7 trillion.”157 
Despite holding nearly $2 trillion in assets as a whole there are very few top 
players.  Only “3% of funds manage more than $500 million, 15% of funds 
manage $100-$500 million, and roughly 38% manage each category of $5-25 
million and $25-100 million.”158  Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan has speculated that consolidation in the hedge fund industry will occur 
to create firms that can compete at the top levels.159 
Hedge funds’ assets, as a percentage of GDP, haves jumped from 5.6% to 
15% from 2003 to 2007.160  The ascension of hedge funds is due to a variety of 
reasons.  For one, hedge funds have earned a reputation for producing outstanding 
years with sustained above-average returns (yielding about 8% above the S & P 
over the last seven years).161  A second reason is that hedge funds utilize greater 
diversification than traditional managers to provide portfolios that can survive any 
type of political/economic climate.162  There have been some attempts to quantify 
how successful hedge funds have been by looking at the risk and returns of hedge 
funds based on samples, but the results are still speculative.163 
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Due to their strong performance and growth, hedge funds can significantly 
influence the market.  Hedge funds can enhance liquidity, reallocate financial risk 
and lead to innovation, all of which promotes efficiency and evolution.164  Patrick 
Parkinson, Deputy Director of the Division of Research and Statistics of the 
Federal Reserve Board, stated in 2006: 
In various capital markets, hedge funds are increasingly consequential as providers 
of liquidity and absorbers of risk.  For example, a study of the markets in U.S. 
dollar interest rate options indicated that participants viewed hedge funds as a 
significant stabilizing force.  In particular, when the options and other fixed income 
markets were under stress in the summer of 2003, the willingness of hedge funds to 
sell options following a spike in the options prices helped restore market liquidity 
and limit losses to derivatives dealers and investors in fixed-rate mortgages and 
mortgage-backed securities.  Hedge funds reportedly are significant buyers of the 
riskier equity and subordinated tranches of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
and of asset-backed securities, including securities backed by nonconforming 
residential mortgages.165 
However, hedge funds also have the potential to disrupt markets.166  Due to 
their excessive leverage and aggressive strategies hedge funds can exacerbate 
conditions and increase the volatility and uncertainty in markets.167  Whether 
hedge funds are viewed in a positive or negative light, it is consistently held that 
they have a significant impact on the markets.168 
C. Structure 
Hedge funds usually incorporate as a limited partnership (LP) or limited 
liability corporation (LLC), maintaining both onshore and offshore presences (for 
legal and tax purposes).169  Typically, the onshore and offshore accounts follow 
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similar strategies, securities and advisers and are both offered to clients.170  
Usually this operates on a master-feeder structure that trades through a single 
entity to accommodate both taxable and tax exempt (such as pension funds or 
charitable trusts) investors.171  The following chart summarizes much of the 
information about performance, structure and other key statistics: 
 
Characteristics Mean Median Mode 
Fund Size $87 million $22 million $10 million 
Fund Age 5.9 years 5.3 years 5.0 years 
Minimum investment 
required 
$695,000 $250,000 $250,000 
Number of Entry Dates 34 12 12 
Number of Exit Dates 28 4 4 
Management Fee 1.7% 1.0% 1.0% 
 
Performance Allocation 
(“Fee”) 
15.9% 20.0% 20.0% 
 
Manager’s Experience 
   
In Securities Industry 17 years 15 years 10 years 
In Portfolio Management 11 years 10 years 10 years 
 
Percent Responding “Yes” 
 
Manager is a U.S. registered investment advisor 45% 
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Fund has hurdle rate 17% 
Fund has high water mark 75% 
Fund has audited financial statements or audited 
performance 
98% 
Manager has $500,000 or own money in fund 75% 
Fund can handle “hot issues” 53% 
Fund is diversified 57% 
Fund can short sell 84% 
Fund can use leverage 72% 
Fund uses derivatives for hedging only, or none 71%172 
This survey exposes some shocking results.  The first is the relative 
inexperience of the field.  A fund’s age of roughly six years pales in comparison to 
other major financial institutions that have been around sometimes as old as 100 
years.173  Though a manager’s experience is slightly greater, this still is relatively 
short when contrasted to top executives at traditional investment managers who 
have several decades under their belt.174 
A second surprise is that the minimal investment required by hedge funds is 
well above the statutory benchmark.175  One reason this number is so high is that 
some hedge funds set the minimum high because they only cater to institutions, 
pension funds and endowments that invest hundreds of millions at a time.176  The 
rationale is that there are now fewer clients to handle and therefore the ability to 
negotiate, keep in touch and cater to each client is improved.177 
The management and performance fees, entry dates and exit dates all fit with 
the common descriptions and definitions advanced by the government.178  The 
fund size also complies with earlier reports, including Greenspan’s recognition that 
there are very few players at the top.179 
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The “Yes/No” portion of the survey also indicates some unusual 
phenomenon.  The most surprising is that only 57% are diversified, when the 
cornerstone to hedge fund investment strategies is to diversify and therefore 
survive in all climates.180  A second revelation is that three out of every four 
managers have significant amounts of their money in their own funds.181  This is 
an example of putting all of one’s eggs in one basket.  Should the unthinkable 
happen and a fund goes under not only does the manager lose his/her source of 
revenue but also much of their personal income. 
A new structure in the hedge fund world is fund of funds.182  Fund of funds 
pool capital and then invest in a package of hedge funds.183  Some regulators are 
concerned that this option will circumvent investor qualifications for hedge funds 
and open up to the general public.184  Fund of funds have grown in popularity since 
they are seen as a way to quickly and efficiently diversify an investor’s risk across 
hedge funds.185  The fee structure for this scenario is similar to traditional hedge 
fund fees, with both performance and fixed components. 
D. Fees, Strategies and Leverage 
A typical fee hedge funds extract for their services is to take one to two 
percent as a management fee (a fixed fee) and roughly twenty percent of the fund’s 
profits as well (a performance fee).186  Hedge funds will invest in a variety of 
instruments, including over-the-counter instruments (particularly derivatives) or 
markets involving foreign exchange, short positions, futures, equity and income to 
earn these fees.187  Hedge funds also employ a vast array of sophisticated strategies 
(i.e. currencies, derivatives and short positions) to gain value for their funds and 
justify the fees.188 
Strategies are often lumped into four different groups: 1) Market Neutral 
Group, 2) Long/Short Equity Group, 3) Directional Trading Group, and the 4) 
Specialty Strategies Group.  Market Neutral strategies typically invest in an 
opportunity unique to one sub-set of securities while maintaining broad exposure 
(and therefore hedging risks) against wider securities.189 
Common strategies in this group include Equity Market Neutral 
opportunities where a manager invests in short and long security positions to 
encompass gains and losses in the market.190  A second type is Distressed 
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Securities, where managers invest in companies having financial difficulties and 
stand to make money should they successfully reorganize.191  A third type is 
Special Situations where a firm may long or short a stock due to a unique occasion 
(such as an acquisition or merger).192  Three other highly utilized methods include: 
Statistical Arbitrage – The manager uses quantitative criteria to choose a long 
portfolio of temporarily undervalued stocks and a rough equal-sized short portfolio 
of temporarily overvalued stocks.  Trades tend to be short-term and the overall 
portfolio is usually neutral in terms of various risk characteristics (beta, sector 
exposure, etc.).  ‘Pairs trading’ is a common form of statistical arbitrage. . . 
Event-Driven – The manager focuses investment activities on significant catalyst-
type events, such as spin-offs, mergers and acquisition, bankruptcy reorganizations, 
recapitalizations and share buybacks.  Some managers who employ Event-Drive 
trading strategies may shift the majority weighting between Merger Arbitrage and 
Distressed Securities, while others may take a broader scope.  Typical trades and 
instruments used may include long and short common and preferred stocks, debt 
securities, options and credit default swaps.  Leverage may be employed by some 
managers. . . 
Merger arbitrage – The manager will take positions in companies undergoing 
“special situations,” for example, when on firm is to be acquired by another, or is 
preparing for a reorganization or spin-off.  A frequent trade is “long the acquiree, 
short the acquirer.”193 
The Long/Short Equity Group primarily relies on long and short exposures in 
the market.  Aggressive growth strategies target companies whose earnings per 
share are expected to take off (due to price momentum or other factors).194  Short 
selling is the exact opposite as a manager targets stocks he/she feels are overvalued 
and therefore eventually their value will fall.195 
Directional Trading Groups look at general trends and predicted future of the 
environment.  Futures are where a hedge fund agrees to buy/sell a stock for a given 
price in the future, trying to capitalize on the predicted movement of the stock.196  
Macro strategies invest in global trends and predict asset classes as a whole (for 
instance a hedge fund may predict the U.S. dollar will fall).197  One last strategy is: 
Market Timing – The manager attempts to predict the short-term movements of 
various markets (or market segments) and, based on those predictions, moves 
capital from one segment to another in order to capture market gains and avoid 
market losses.  While a variety of investment categories may be used, the most 
typical ones are various mutual funds and money market funds.  Market timing 
managers focusing on these mutual funds are sometimes referred to as mutual fund 
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switchers.198 
The last group is the Specialty Strategies Group, which acts as a catch-all 
that includes special, diverse strategies.199  Emerging Markets invest in developing 
economies that have huge potential (such as Brazil or India).200  And Income 
strategies look at current income vehicles like bonds to gain quicker returns.201 
To magnify their strategies, hedge funds often utilize various levels of 
leveraging (borrowing money to amplify positions).202  Traditional managers are 
limited by the Investment Act which can dictate how they gain leverage (i.e. open-
ended investment companies can only leverage through bank loans) and also by 
how much a manager can leverage.203  Hedge funds are not subject to these 
constraints and thus can obtain higher degrees of leverage from a wider range of 
sources, which increases the returns as well as risks of a hedge fund.204 
IV. TRADE SECRET ARGUMENT 
Hedge funds such as Two Sigma Investments and Bulldog have advanced 
trade secret arguments against Rule 13(f).  Much like hedge funds, trade secrets 
resist definition.205  For instance, the Restatement (First) of Torts (Restatement) 
has struggled to define the term but ultimately published its definition of a trade 
secret as: 
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s 
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it.  It may be a formula for a chemical 
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern 
for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.206 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) which, while acknowledging that a 
precise definition is difficult, added to the concept the idea that a trade secret is 
subject to reasonable constraints to keep it secret.207  A typical two prong test 
courts use is “[first prong - the plaintiff] possessed a trade secret and [second 
prong] that the defendant used that trade secret in breach of an agreement, a 
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confidential agreement, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means.”208  
Although there are no hard and fast rules for establishing the first prong, at the 
very least, the claimant must show they were actively trying to prevent the release 
of their information.209  In an SEC comment letter to the UTSA, they advise that 
some standard examples are advising employees that there is a trade secret, 
limiting knowledge of the trade secret to a need to know basis and limiting plant 
access.210 
Justifications for trade secret protection fall into three categories.211  
Economically, trade secrets provide remedies and protections additional to 
conventional tort laws and thus may inspire innovation.212  Philosophically, it’s 
accepted that one person should not unjustly benefit from acquiring a trade secret 
through some improper means (such as breach of confidence).213  The third, and 
weakest, argument is a populist one – the vast majority of states support protection 
and this perpetuates protection.214 
A. First Prong – Possessing a Trade Secret 
Hedge fund interests arguably constitute “property” that is protected by trade 
secret law and the Fifth Amendment.215  Again there is no set test to determine a 
trade secret exists but the Restatement identified six key factors: 
(1) The extent to which the information is known outside of his business; 
(2) The extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in his 
business; 
(3) The extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information; 
(4) The value of the information to him and to his competitors; 
(5) The amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the information; 
(6) The ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or 
duplicated by others.216 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, an intellectual property professor, examined in 
further detail “reasonable efforts” to establish and protect a trade secret.217  He 
concluded that a manager must show they expended substantial resources, 
including financial and man-power.218  Other relevant economic considerations are 
the extent of adequate protections, compliance with industry standards, 
communication to and restriction thereof concerning employees, and non-
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disclosure documentation when it is necessary to divulge the information to third- 
parties.219  Professor Beckerman-Rodau next raised ascertainable factors such as 
the amount of time and money necessary to reverse-engineer the secret, third-
parties’ unsuccessful attempts at duplication as well as third-party willingness to 
pay for the information.220 
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, the Supreme Court addressed mandatory data 
about pesticides that were submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency and 
then ultimately published.221  The Court held the information is in fact protected by 
trade secret law, first recognizing that various intangible interests can be seen as 
property under the Fifth Amendment.222  The Court reasoned that due to the fact 
that the data requires extensive financial resources to ascertain (typically five to 
fifteen million dollars annually), a lengthy period of time to develop (usually 
fourteen to twenty-two years), thousands of screened pesticides before endorsing 
one and the security measures in place to guard the information that it was in fact a 
trade secret.223 
Goldstein’s exemption relied heavily on the Ruckelshaus case.224  Goldstein 
uses the case to support his strategies are considered property, the disclosures are 
mandatory and he claims there are no reciprocal benefits for his firm.225  However, 
Goldstein fails to provide the amount of man hours, resources and finances 
employed to protect his information.226  These are all steps that are advertised in 
the Restatement and important to the Ruckelshaus Court. 
There has, on the other hand, been a history of Goldstein and Bulldog 
revealing the very same privileged information they now desperately seek to 
protect.227  There are three major instances that hinder his argument: a publication 
to a court, a letter and a failure to secure information about a private offering.228  
To the court, it might now appears that Goldstein utilizes the information when it 
is in his favor but now feels that information would hamper his competitive 
edge.229 
The first is during a lawsuit between Goldstein and Lincoln National 
Convertible Securities Fund, Inc. the facts included stated that “Goldstein provided 
investment advice and money management services to family, friends and four 
clients.”230  All of these funds had varying investment objectives and different 
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degrees of control, but they did allow Goldstein discretionary trading privileges.231  
Through the testimony of Goldstein’s family, friends and clients, many of whom 
were Bulldog investors, it became clear to the court that Goldstein discussed at 
length strategies and implementing procedures.232  A key issue is that many of 
these are discussions about strategy with the investors that occurred before the 
trades were actually executed and protected.233  There are no obvious studies on 
the information hedge fund managers informally give, however, if a future case is 
brought this would, again, be an issue to examine. 
The second occurrence was in September 2006, less than a month before 
Goldstein filed the exemption request.234  In a Conference Call with Millennium 
Media Consulting Money Manager Series Goldstein “revealed aspects of his hedge 
fund investment strategies for generating ‘alpha.’”235  HedgeCo, an online 
informational portal on hedge funds, defines alpha as the value a hedge fund 
produces by comparing the manager’s performance against a risk-free investment 
(like a United States Treasury Bill).236  Therefore, revealing the firm’s alpha 
strategies is tantamount to Goldstein revealing the firm’s overall investment 
strategies.237  Managers often publicly speak about their hedge fund, differentiating 
it from others often by discussing their strategies at a broad level (for instance six 
other managers spoke at the same event Goldstein did). 
The third instance involves a complaint lodged against Goldstein.238  The 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Securities Division for Massachusetts brought the 
claim alleging several wrongdoings.239  Although Goldstein was ultimately found 
not guilty of these charges they do cast the shadow of doubt on his situation.  
Among these were violations of the Massachusetts Uniform Securities Act for 
having improper security controls on their website.240  Prospective clients can 
access the website only by agreeing to a superficial disclaimer, and can then view 
the private offerings.241  Again, hedge funds need to carefully monitor what 
information is displayed on their websites to avoid a claim of general solicitation. 
These offerings can reveal substantial information about the firm’s investing 
philosophies and strategies.242  Not only did Bulldog passively allow this 
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information to come out, but the complaint also alleges that Bulldog sent e-mail 
investment solicitations to at least one Massachusetts resident which included 
investment strategies, investment examples, performance analyses and asset 
information among other firm information.243  Goldstein has publicly and 
repeatedly dismissed these charges and promoted First Amendment rights as his 
defense.244 
B. Second Prong – Improper Appropriation of the Trade Secret 
The second prong requires proof that disclosure of the information to be 
protected information would unfairly benefit or advantage a competitor.245  13F 
forms arguably enable investors to reverse-engineer hedge fund investments.  For 
instance, David Ross, a Vice President for an economics consulting firm, argues 
that looking at sequential filings can let an investor adequately determine the net 
amount of shares bought or sold of a particular stock during a quarter.246  
Furthermore an investor could deduce the number of shares currently being held by 
the company.247  Although investors may have some difficulty in precisely 
replicating a hedge fund’s strategy a 13F could enable one to determine the fund’s 
weights for various sectors, new holdings, the level of its strategic aggressiveness, 
timing of purchases and sales and other critical decisions.248 
The SEC will argue that the information contained in 13F forms will provide 
at best snippets of a firm’s strategy, rather than a complete guide.249  For one, not 
all securities must be reported.250  Only those that are publically traded, such as 
those on the New York Mercantile Exchange, are included.251  Many positions like 
short stocks (whether on short equity, future or option positions) are not 
reported.252  Shares of open-ended investment companies (like mutual funds), 
shares less than 10,000 in number and less than $200,000 in value, shares that 
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appear only on foreign exchanges and put or call options that the firm itself writes 
all do not need to be included.253 
The first issue with 13Fs is their content, the second are their timing.254  By 
the time these reports are made available to the public the information is forty-five 
days old.255  Many hedge fund strategies move quickly and by the time the reports 
are published their opportunities are over.  For example, Event Driven, Merger and 
Market Timing strategies are all very sensitive to current market conditions and 
may be outdated by the time 13Fs are published. 
The last argument the SEC will advance is the manager’s ability to seek an 
exemption from 13(f).  Rule 13(f)(3) provides the SEC with the power to grant 
confidential treatment on a case by case basis.256  Therefore when a manager meets 
these requirements (most importantly a specific strategy and resulting harm) the 
SEC will cooperate with the firm in protecting that strategy.257  These three 
responses will most likely be enough for the SEC. 
V. ANALYSIS UNDER A REGULATORY TAKINGS ARGUMENT 
The concept of a takings argument has a rich and complicated history.  The 
basis for a takings action is grounded in the Fifth Amendment which states “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”258  
Much of the following casework focuses on real property.  At the heart of Berman 
v. Parker, a seminal case before the Supreme Court, a Redevelopment Act 
authorized the government to seize blighted property in an attempt to stimulate 
growth.259  One shopkeeper argued that his affected land was commercial, not 
residential, and would be redeveloped under private management thus violating his 
rights.260  The Court upheld the statute and gave broad deference to the 
Legislature’s use of eminent domain.261  This broad understanding has been upheld 
through many cases.262 
For over 100 years, courts have recognized instances where government 
regulations are to such a high degree that they are in essence a government taking, 
even if physical property is not seized.263  An important decision in Kelo v. City of 
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New London reaffirmed a broad understanding for regulatory takings.264  The 
Court reviewed a development plan that needed to seize property from several 
shopkeepers to complete the project.265  Although their property was not blighted, 
the Court once again gave great deference to the city’s determination.266  One year 
after the Kelo decision, President Bush issued an Executive Order stating that 
regulatory takings are necessary to preserve the general interest and not just 
advancing the economic interest of private parties.267 
To fully analyze a regulatory takings argument the scenario must be assessed 
through five phases: 1) threshold questions, 2) is this a per se taking, 3) is there 
linkage, 4) a balancing test and 5) is this taking for public use.  It is through this 
lens that Goldstein’s argument will be discussed. 
The first phase addresses threshold questions.  The first, and easiest, of the 
threshold questions is whether or not there is some form of government action.  In 
Goldstein’s case the answer is definitively yes, the SEC requires hedge funds to 
file 13F forms with their agency.  These forms are then published on the SEC’s 
website at their EDGAR database for the public to view. 
Next, the court must determine if the claimed loss is a property right.  For 
purposes of a takings argument, property has been defined as “denot[ing] the group 
of rights inherent in the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to 
possess, use and dispose of it.”268  Courts later relaxed this definition to encompass 
non-physical items as well as recognizing that when “regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking.”269 
Presumably, the case would be heard in a New York court since Bulldog is 
incorporated there.  New York, traditionally, has a more lenient interpretation of 
what is property than other courts and therefore Goldstein should have enough 
evidence to satisfy this prong.270  One of the most famous New York intellectual 
property cases held that a license was property even though it did not have an exact 
market value.271  Therefore, if the case is heard in New York Goldstein has a better 
chance for getting past the first prong.  Ultimately, the court will probably 
acknowledge Goldstein’s investment strategies as constituting a property right. 
The second phase of the analysis is to ask if the claimed loss is a per se 
taking.  If the loss is in fact a per se taking then there is no need to conduct a 
balancing test.  However, courts have been very restrictive in assigning per se 
status and have carved out only three main categories, the first being a complete 
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loss of economic viability.272  This is not the case for Goldstein since Bulldog is 
still maintaining healthy profits. 
The second category is for permanent physical occupation by the 
government.273  Since there is no permanent physical invasion as interpreted by the 
courts (such as taking an inheritance or moving soil), Goldstein will not prevail 
here.  The third is for core rights.274  This is the hardest area to convince the courts 
because they have really only accepted the rights to devise/alienate land and the 
right to sell as core rights.275  Therefore, this case will most likely not fall under a 
per se taking. 
The third analysis is linkage.  To evaluate linkage the Court in Dolan v. City 
of Tigard settled on a nexus test.276  This is a rough proportionality test which asks 
if there is a nexus between the goal of the program and what the government is 
actually doing.277  Assuming the analysis moves past threshold and per se 
questions this is one of the two main thrusts for Goldstein’s takings clause 
argument.  Goldstein asserts this notion clearly in his request for an exemption 
stating: 
The legislative history of 13(f) indicates that its primary purpose was to fill an 
information gap about the activities of institutional investment managers that would 
enable the Commission to diverse regulatory initiatives.  However, the Commission 
has never used the data in 13F filings for that purpose.  Therefore, despite 
Congress’ intent in 1975 when it adopted 13(f), there has been no actual connection 
between the disclosure scheme of 13(f)(1) and any regulatory use of the resultant 
data disclosures.278 
Furthermore, Goldstein’s exemption claims that no investor can gain market 
confidence from these forms.279  Indeed, Goldstein says that increasing investor 
confidence is not necessarily a rational goal to begin with.280  The exemption ends 
on the note that, “the suggestion that 13F filings are routinely used for any 
legitimate purpose is disingenuous.”281 
The SEC will most likely counter with two arguments: 1) 13F forms have in 
fact been used as their intended informational database; and 2) 13F forms have 
been used to increase market confidence.  Regarding databases as late as 2004, the 
SEC has commented “neither we nor any other government agency has any 
reliable data on even the number of hedge funds or the amount of their assets.  We 
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must rely on third-party surveys and reports, which often conflict and may be 
unreliable.”282  However, the EDGAR database and 13F forms help provide 
“information that is reliable, current, and complete” in one database.283  These 
databases are used by agencies for a variety of purposes.  For instance, the SEC 
couples 13Fs with other guidelines such as questions potential investors should ask 
to help create more competent investors.284 
The SEC has a much stronger stance demonstrating that these forms have 
been used to increase market confidence, mainly by assisting in the due diligence 
process.  Hedge funds, like all investment managers, have had their share of 
controversies, which has led to increasing standards for due diligence.285  
According to a Deutsche Bank survey, over 60% of institutional investors will take 
between two and six months to complete due diligence on a hedge fund.286  Many 
of them will hire a private investigator to assist and advise them in this process.287  
Advisers will continue to look at these 13F forms for two main reasons.288  The 
first is to match 13F forms filed with the SEC to the reports the hedge fund gives 
the investor to verify that the hedge fund is not trying to deceive either the investor 
or the SEC.289  Secondly, the adviser will look at the 13F forms to make sure the 
hedge fund is pursuing the strategy that the investor and the hedge fund agreed 
upon.290 
A report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Working 
Group) notes that not only do individuals and investors utilize these disclosure 
tools, but other institutions do as well.291  Many banks for instance will look at 
13Fs to help determine their exposure risk and leverage concerns for hedge 
funds.292  13Fs remain invaluable since there is still a division within the industry 
and many hedge funds resist providing meaningful information to 
counterparties.293  Although there can be some expense associated with these 
disclosures to other institutions, they can also be associated with differentiating a 
hedge fund, which can lead to raising capital and gaining favorable terms.294  
Ultimately, the SEC should have sufficient evidence to support that there is in fact 
linkage. 
The court will next balance the interests of the hedge fund managers and 
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those of the government in the fourth analysis.  There are several considerations 
that could push this issue in favor of the SEC.  First, since rule 13(f) applies to 
many different hedge funds, the burden of this rule is spread across a large group, 
as opposed to resting predominantly on the shoulders of Bulldog alone.295  
Secondly, the courts will take into account just how much the property is actually 
diminished in value.296  Goldstein has yet to provide a specific number and at this 
time the decrease in value seems to be insubstantial. 
A third consideration is whether the property owner who is losing property is 
also benefiting. If he or she is also benefiting the court will be less likely to 
consider the actions a taking.297  In this case the SEC will argue that increased 
market confidence will benefit all hedge funds, including Bulldog, by bringing in 
more investors.  Lastly, the precedent of over thirty years has been to allow 13F 
forms.  There has been an increased reliance on these forms, and this is not the 
situation where a new rule is now proposing to take away private property.  Taken 
as a whole these factors seem to weigh in the SEC’s favor. 
The last consideration is whether the taking is for public use.  As noted, 
courts have taken a broad understanding of public use and thus the SEC should 
have no problems satisfying this criterion.  The Court in Berman v. Parker notes 
that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.  The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.”298  As 
long as the exercise in control is rationally related to “a conceivable public 
purpose” and the other prongs are satisfied, the government can go ahead and take 
the property.299 
The government should be able to satisfy this requirement pretty easily, 
stating that increasing investor awareness, promoting market efficiency and 
strengthening market confidence are all for public use.  13(f) protects investors 
from fraud and ensures greater stability in the markets.  If, however, for some 
reason the court does not find there is a public use, the court could justify striking 
down the 13F forms. 
VI. RELATED DISCLOSURE PROPOSALS 
As noted earlier, the public has several qualms about the hedge fund 
industry.  Many feel that hedge funds use their power in unison, controlling the 
market to their will.300  Tangential to this is the fact that hedge funds often utilize 
short positions, which can serve to put negative pressure on a firm’s stock.301  
There has also been a long string of hedge funds collapsing, such as Long Term 
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Capital Management (losing nearly $4.6 billion in 1998),302 and Amaranth 
Advisors (losing $5 billion in 2006).303  There are also the scandals and fraudulent 
actions, such as KL Group admitting to a $194 million scam.304 
These factors, taken together, have led many to fear and distrust the hedge 
fund industry.  One of the most widely supported methods for remedying this 
situation is increased disclosure practices.  In recent years there has been a surge in 
the United States calling for tighter regulations, including some increased 
disclosure requirements.305  President Barack Obama’s nominee to lead the SEC 
vowed to increase enforcement and vigilance, particularly with hedge funds.306  
This sentiment is being seen around the world as nations vow to step up their 
hedge fund regulations.307 
This note will run through several of the most important proposals 
examining their merits, ultimately arguing that any future increases in disclosure 
should be handled very carefully.  There are several considerations to examine 
when looking at these proposals.  The first, and arguably the most important, is 
whether the proposal will hamper a firm’s competitive advantage.  There is a fine 
balance between protecting investors and intrusion into the market place.  When a 
regulation intrudes too far into a firm’s ability to compete it runs counter to the 
will of the Securities and Exchange Acts, as well as the general notion of a 
capitalist market.  There is the added threat of driving investors to foreign hedge 
funds. 
The second set of considerations is the costs of implementation.  The 
Working Group noted in their 1999 report that direct regulations of the hedge fund 
industry come at a great price.308  There are issues of the increased costs for hedge 
funds to comply (including possible registration fees), as well as the burden on the 
SEC and other agencies of enforcing these new regulations.309  Part of what makes 
13(f) so effective is that it neither hampers hedge funds nor imposes large costs on 
them.310  The next set of proposals will be evaluated looking at the same 
considerations.  Many of these proposals, such as the hard-to-value assets 
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recommendation, fail these criteria.  Others, most notably the private market 
intermediary and accredited natural person, fit well within the framework. 
The first proposal is online brochures.  In 2003, a Staff Report to the SEC 
encouraged greater disclosure in the form of a brochure.311  The brochure would be 
designed for both investors and prospective investors alike.312  Contained in the 
brochure would be important information on how the hedge fund operates, 
including: how they value securities, risk management procedures, what lock-in 
periods the firm has, and other valuable information.313  The plan was not initiated, 
however, and put on the backburner. 
In February of 2008 the SEC revisited their plan for brochures.314  Currently 
advisers may offer online brochures to state regulators, but are not required to 
submit them to the SEC or other federal agencies.315  A move to online brochures 
is expected to “reduce compliance costs and yield savings on printing and 
mailing.”316  At this point it is too early to accurately determine if the plan will 
move forward since there are many crucial issues in the precise details of the 
plan.317 
This proposal should not have any adverse affect on hedge funds and, aside 
from an initial switching cost, should not be too burdensome.  The information 
contained in the brochure can be found in a number of places already, and thus 
does not erode any additional competitive edge.  The Staff Report admits that 
much of the information is the same as found in a firm’s offering memorandum 
(OM) or private placement memorandum (PPM).318  These documents are 
provided by hedge funds to prospective clients and provide a fair amount of detail 
about the firm.  However, some, like Duane Thompson, managing director at the 
Financial Planning Association, feel that OMs and PPMs are too thick and 
intimidating.319  The brochure would provide information in a much more user- 
friendly and intuitive format. 
Much of the information is also contained in a firm’s Form ADV.  Generally 
hedge funds with over $25 million in assets under management will file ADVs 
with the SEC.320  Part One of the Form provides basic information about the hedge 
fund, such as headquarters, number of employees and so forth.321  Part One is filed 
and can be recovered electronically.322  Part Two provides more insight into the 
hedge fund’s practices, such as fees, strategies and so forth.323  Part Two is not 
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required to be filed electronically.324  The 2003 Staff Report also acknowledges 
some overlaps with the Form ADV, but again insists there would be additional 
benefits to an online database.325 
The move to online brochures is more of an extension of existing policies 
than a revolutionary change.  Much of the information contained in the brochure 
can already be found in an OM, PPM or Form ADV.  The advantage would be to 
create a database with easier access for investors, where they can quickly compare 
important criteria between hedge funds.  This move should not impair any hedge 
funds and aside from initial set-up costs the plan might actually save money over 
time.  In general, this proposal seems acceptable, but does not seem to make any 
real strides towards addressing the faults in the current regulatory scheme. 
A second recommendation concerns how hard-to-value assets.  The Hedge 
Fund Working Group (HFWG) is a group of hedge fund managers from the United 
Kingdom (UK).326  In June of 2007, the HFWG set out to study in depth the hedge 
fund industry and presented their findings in a Final Report in January of 2008.327  
Based on their findings they recommended several proposals moving forward, 
including several increases in disclosure.328 
One of their proposals is that hedge funds should include more information 
on hard-to-value assets.329  The HFWG writes: 
A hedge fund manager should, in cases where, in its view, the fund has material 
exposure to hard-to-value assets, ensure that any disclosure in its own marketing 
materials relating to the fund’s performance is accompanied by a reference to any 
factors which may be material to the robustness of the performance calculation.  A 
hedge fund manager should also do what it reasonably can to enable and encourage 
the fund governing body to include similar references in the fund’s offering 
documents where they include details of the fund’s performance.330 
Such factors might, amongst others, include: the percentage of the portfolio 
invested in what the manager considers being hard-to-value assets; the method used 
in valuing assets which the manager considers to be hard-to-value; and the use of 
side pockets.331 
- the percentage of the portfolio invested in what the manager considers to be hard-
to-value assets; 
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- the method used in valuing assets which the manager considers to be hard-to-
value; and 
- the use of side pockets.332 
The theory behind this recommendation is that hard-to-value assets in 
particular pose a huge risk for investors.333  Their value can swing dramatically 
and thus investors may not be fully aware of their risk.334  Even sophisticated and 
savvy investors may not fully appreciate their risk without knowing some of the 
basics to the hedge fund’s operations on hard-to-value assets.  That being said, 
providing a percentage of the portfolio in hard-to-value assets, the first of the 
HFWG’s recommendations, will prove difficult to provide and may unduly scare 
aware investors.  Providing investors with all of their hard-to-value methods, the 
second recommendation might handcuff hedge funds in the future and limit their 
competitive edge.  Rather, it might be beneficial for hedge funds to offer a few 
examples of their methods in the OM or PPM to give investors an idea. 
The third recommendation deals with side pockets.  Side pockets are “similar 
to a single-asset private equity fund.”335  Hard-to-value (or sometimes illiquid) 
assets are often designated for a side pocket to provide greater flexibility to the 
hedge fund.336  Once the asset is in the side pocket new clients will not share in it, 
existing clients may redeem the value once it is finally liquidated.337  Fees are 
similar with a management and incentive fee, but the terms of the side pocket are 
looser.338  There may be no date for liquidation, and fewer limitations on the size 
and nature to the side pocket.339  Adding additional information on the use of side 
pockets in the OM and PPM will give investors greater insight for the future, but 
ultimately is not necessary.  Side pockets are largely negotiated on a one-on-one 
basis and therefore the investors will be fully informed of the conditions upon 
entering into the side pocket agreement. 
There are several important issues to note about this proposal.  The first is 
that the HFWG is UK- based and has no direct influence in the United States.  
However, the UK is an important financial center for hedge funds and US 
regulators look closely at their practices.340  Assets under European hedge funds 
grew 80% from 2003 to 2005, investors view the United States’ markets as more 
regulated and controlled (largely due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) and the euro 
helping European investors are just some of the reasons for the UK’s recent 
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surge.341  The United States will certainly keep an eye on if these regulations are 
put in place and their effect. 
A second issue is that the HFWG is not the formal UK regulatory body.  
They are a group of self appointed managers who undertook this project on their 
own.342  Critics argue that the HFWG is a non-independent board that has an 
obvious interest in how hedge fund regulation proceeds.343  These critics feel that 
investors’ priorities were not sufficiently represented and that while the Final 
Report is a solid start, much work needs to be included.344  Interested parties in the 
United States, like the SEC, surely recognize that the HFWG is not independent 
and will view their proposals through this lens.  Due to the excessive scope and 
costs associated with this project it would benefit the SEC to wait and see how this 
regulation plays out in the UK first before moving ahead with their own initiative.  
However, in its current form the proposal seems to place too great a burden on 
hedge funds and will hamper their competitive edge.  
The HFWG’s Final Report has an even bolder proposal for the future of 
hedge fund disclosure, and that is industry disclosures.  The proposal is to create an 
easily navigable database on industry characteristics made available to the 
public.345  The information would include statistics like the number of hedge funds 
in existence, assets under management, definitions (of strategies, industry terms 
like side pockets and similar issues), typical fee structures and other useful 
information to investors.  HFWG Chairman Sir Andrew Large said: “The initiative 
had come about because the industry’s largest firms recognize there is a deficit in 
accurate and comprehensive information about the hedge fund industry, and that 
they should rectify it.  Improvement is needed in two areas: publicly available 
generic data about the sector; and information about individual firms.”346 
The first obstacle to this proposal is that hedge funds can not advertise and 
solicit the general population.347  Sir Large advocates that if the information is 
purely factual in nature and not used as a solicitation the project could go 
forward.348  Even information as seemingly harmless as assets under management 
could be viewed as a selling point if easily compared to assets under management 
by other types of investment managers (such as mutual funds).  Additionally, 
typical strategies that are available to hedge funds exclusively may be seen as an 
advantage and therefore a selling point. 
The second obstacle is the cost associated with maintaining accurate 
information.349  Statistics, such as the number of hedge funds and assets under 
management, will constantly be changing and surveying the markets could be 
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costly.  Determining how often to update the information is another issue that has 
direct implications for the costs of the project. 
In its current state this proposal seems unlikely to gain traction in the United 
States anytime soon.  One adaptation would be to move forward with the project, 
but only make the information available to sophisticated investors who qualify to 
invest with hedge funds.  The industry characteristics can be provided to investors, 
along with the hedge fund’s OM or PPM, to give the investor a better feel about 
the industry as a whole.  This might serve as one last warning to investors who 
technically qualify to invest with hedge funds but who still lack the sophistication 
to truly appreciate the risks associated with doing so. 
Another proposal that has been advanced is the creation of a new regulatory 
body.350  This proposal can manifest itself in one of two forms, the first of which is 
a self regulation organization.  A pure market discipline theory, or self regulation, 
argues that banks and securities firms have incentives, including shareholder 
pressure, to limit their risk to hedge funds.351  Avoiding excessive risk will force 
banks to limit their exposure to hedge funds, or in other words, hedge funds’ 
leveraging will be capped.352  However, this theory often breaks down since in 
good times banks are more generous with their loan processes to obtain even 
greater returns.353 
Self regulation is sometimes augmented by introducing a self regulation 
organization (SRO), such as the Federal Reserve.354  The SEC could help assist in 
the creation of the SRO and what its powers would be.355  SROs usually keep up 
with industry needs and trends fairly well and can be more sensitive to compliance 
costs than a pure regulatory body.356  SROs internalize the costs for regulation and 
therefore have a natural incentive not to over-regulate the industry since they are 
the ones to who balance the costs and benefits.357 
A SRO would have the benefit of industry support, natural incentives not to 
over-regulate, fair fee schedules, and the ability to maintain a pure market feel to 
the industry.358  A SRO would help prevent some of the fraudulent activities and 
blow-ups that have plagued the industry.  However, establishing the boundaries for 
the SRO might prove difficult.  How much hedge funds would be required to 
disclose to the SRO, and how that information would be protected, would need to 
be addressed from the start.  This method has promise but is currently not being 
supported by any major agencies or big players in the industry and for the moment 
does not appear to be seriously considered.  A more likely solution will be in the 
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second form of a new regulatory body, that is, a private market intermediary. 
The second version of a new regulatory body to examine is a “private market 
intermediary.”359  This has the unique feature of increased disclosure to a private 
party, rather than the public at large.360  Under this plan a singular or select few 
private rating agencies would receive increased information about the hedge funds, 
such as more details about their leverage and risk.361  For this plan to move 
forward there would have to be assurances on the safety of the firm’s propriety 
data, but the government has made similar agreements in the past.362 
This will in effect create industry standards which the intermediary will 
monitor.363  Hedge funds will need to be certified by meeting minimal standards 
and operational practices.364  In order to receive future investors the firm will need 
to maintain its certification, otherwise it will lose substantial business.365  
Proponents of this solution do not feel that it is a stand alone solution since the 
influence of institutional investors is not limitless.366 
This plan offers several significant advantages to all interested parties.  This 
would definitely ease concerns for investors, such as pension plans, who will now 
take comfort in minimal standards and increased oversight.367  Secure hedge funds 
will most likely already meet the standards and may welcome the change as a 
chance to block out future competitors.  They might also benefit by increased 
investor confidence which would translate into new investors to entering the 
market.  The SEC and other regulatory agencies will also benefit.  Hedge funds 
will finally be regulated bringing greater security and stability to the markets, but 
the SEC will not have to deal with the direct costs of the oversight. 
However, there are a number of drawbacks and weaknesses to this approach.  
There are several issues surrounding the establishment of the intermediary.  Hedge 
funds will not back this proposal without feeling secure that their propriety 
information can not be leaked or will be shared with other government agencies.  
Small hedge funds are particularly likely to resist since the costs will impact them 
more and getting certified might prove more difficult.  There is also the issue of 
agreeing on industry standards.  Firms already disagree on effective (and 
responsible) levels of leverage, investment strategies, general disclosure 
requirements, fees and other operational considerations.  Furthermore, the 
considerations large, established firms will agree on can drastically differ from 
those of smaller firms just starting up.  Investors, for that matter, also differ on 
what are acceptable standards.368  A further drawback is that potential conflict of 
interests could arise with the intermediary serving both investor and hedge fund 
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interests.369 
Another consideration for this proposal is where will funding will come 
from.370  One answer would be for hedge funds to pay a registration fee; however, 
this will likely deter hedge fund support.  The intermediary could receive funding 
from the federal government but that means that the taxpayers would bear the 
burden and that could prove difficult.  Investors could pay a modest fee when they 
access the intermediary’s information but that alone probably would not be 
sufficient.  The most likely answer is a combination of the different fees to spread 
the cost around. 
This proposal has a lot of merit behind it, although there are substantial 
hurdles to overcome.  The concerns with hedge funds, such as overleveraging and 
fraudulent accounting practices, would be addressed with greater oversight.  At the 
same time a firm’s competitive advantage is not severely hampered since the 
information is not shared with the public or other hedge funds.  This plan does not 
appear to be ready for action anytime soon, though.  First, hedge funds must agree 
with the standards which could get drawn out.  The issues of funding the program, 
information security and other operational considerations also threaten this 
program.  All the factors taken together weigh favorably for this policy to move 
forward. 
A fifth proposal centers on commodity pool operator filings.  Commodity 
Pool Operators (CPO) are organizations or individuals who pools funds into 
commodity options or commodity futures.371  CPOs register with the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and as such have to submit annual filings.372  
These filings include risk and performance disclosures under Title 17 of the 
Commodity and Securities Exchanges §4.373  Many hedge funds meet these 
requirements and do in fact register and report to the CFTC.374 
The Working Group recommended several changes for hedge funds that are 
also registered CPOs in their 1999 report.375  The first suggestion is that these 
reports are filed quarterly instead of annually, allowing the information to reach 
investors quicker than the current process.376  In addition, the scope of these 
reports should include more information on market risk “without requiring the 
disclosure of proprietary information on strategies or positions.”377  Lastly, 
individual financial reports should also be published.378 
This suggestion has several complications that dim its chances.  The first is 
that not all hedge funds are CPOs and therefore do not register with the CFTC.  
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The Working Group makes note of this point and suggests that Congress enact 
legislation mirroring the CFTC’s regulations.379  Getting the legislation off the 
ground and having it match the CFTC’s in order to avoid unfairly burdening one 
group of hedge funds (i.e. those that are CPOs or those that are not) will take time 
and may even prove impossible. 
The second complication is that many CPOs opt out of the disclosure 
requirements of the CFTC.380  A CPO needs to satisfy two conditions to do so.  
First, the CPO must not be subject to any statutory disqualifications under Rules 
§8(a)(2) and §8(a)(3).381  This means that the CPO must be free from fraud, 
material investigations, penalties and the like.  Second, the CPO must meet all of 
§4.7’s requirements.382  The quickest, and most efficient way, to do this is having 
the client sign a §4.7 waiver, which enables the CPO to treat the client like a 
Qualified Eligible Person.383  The CPO must still file the annual report, but does 
not need to file as much information.384 
If the CFTC pushed filing from an annual schedule to quarterly, it would 
receive opposition, not only from hedge fund managers, but from all CPOs.  A 
similar sentiment surrounds expanding the scope of disclosure requirements since 
this risks revealing propriety information.  Even if these changes are approved, not 
all hedge funds are CPOs and many that are opt out of significant portions of the 
disclosure process.  All these factors taken together mar this proposal’s chances. 
A sixth proposal concerns how material exposures to highly leveraged 
companies are disclosed.  The Working Group made another disclosure proposal in 
their 1999 report; however, it was for public companies and not hedge funds.385  
The Working Group offers that public companies, including both financial and 
non-financial firms, should “publicly disclose a summary of direct material 
exposures to significantly leveraged financial institutions.”386  Leveraged financial 
institutions could include hedge funds, banks, finance companies and others.387  
The rationale behind this move is to add greater weight to private market discipline 
and cause public companies to pay closer attention to their risk lest running the risk 
of enraging their shareholders.388 
Currently, neither the SEC nor the generally accepted accounting principals 
specifically call for such a measure.389  The information conveyed should include 
their exposures and to whom, how they are measured and their diversification.  
The Working Group suggests this information could be contained in a document 
publicly filed with the SEC, such as Form 10-K and Form 10-Q.390 
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This proposal has been mulled over by authorities following the collapse of 
LTCM in 1999.391  Following the collapse, Patrick Parkinson, Associate Director 
of Division of Research and Statistics at the Federal Reserve, testified that: 
Primary responsibility for addressing the weaknesses in risk management practices 
that were evident in the LTCM episode rests with the private financial 
institutions—a relatively small number of U.S. and foreign banks and broker-
dealers, most of which were LTCM’s counterparties. . . . [P]rudential supervisors 
and regulators have a responsibility to help to ensure that the processes that banks 
and securities firms utilize to manage risk are commensurate with the size and 
complexity of their portfolios and responsive to changes in financial market 
conditions.392 
This proposal has several advantages that makes it attractive.  First, the costs 
associated with this idea are minimal since this information is readily available to 
public companies already.  Second, this should not hamper competitive edges too 
much since banks and other public companies already make it known to 
shareholders that they do in fact invest in hedge funds, but do not necessarily 
disclose full amounts.  This recommendation has minimal intrusion into the market 
place and could make large strides in restoring investor confidence. 
One last disclosure proposal concerns investor requirements.  Currently there 
are minimal requirements investors must meet in order to pool their money into a 
hedge fund.  These standards have not been revamped for over twenty years now 
and many regulators feel they are outdated.  By elevating the standards, even fewer 
people will be allowed to receive a hedge fund’s PPM or OM and other materials.  
By extension, this means that even fewer people will receive the disclosure 
statements from hedge funds.  Increasing the standards to include fewer people 
will limit the number of potential investors, which is a huge downside for hedge 
funds.  The regulation will, however, mean that only the most sophisticated 
investors will receive the information and should know how to employ it most 
effectively.  There have been several variations of this proposal put forth. 
The first variation deals with accredited investors.  The current standard is 
people who earn $200,000 a year or who hold over $1 million in net worth.393  
Since this standard was first introduced over twenty years ago the number of 
people who meet these criteria has increased significantly.394  However, some meet 
this benchmark due to inflation and not a true increase in wealth.395  Raising the 
bar would ensure that only sophisticated investors are involved which allows 
hedge funds to take on their risky investments without overregulation.396 
This regulation will most likely include a grandfather clause for those who 
are current investors but would not meet the new standards.  Therefore, this 
regulation will do little to comfort these investors.  A second complication is that 
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the SEC and other regulatory bodies will not benefit much from this new change.  
There is no increase in the amount of data available to the agencies for them to 
make decisions. 
The second variation looks at accredited natural persons.  At the end of 2006, 
the SEC set in motion a proposal to create a new class of investor, the accredited 
natural person, who would be allowed to invest in hedge funds.397  This definition 
would supersede that of the accredited investor and therefore replace it.398  The 
new proposal states that a person must have at least $2.5 million (adjusted every 
five years for inflation) to meet the minimal requirements.399  The exact number of 
investors who will now fail to meet the requirements has not yet been studied. 
The difference between the two recommendations is essentially how high the 
bar should be raised.  Of the two measures the SEC’s accredited natural person 
criteria has the essential benefit of including measures for the future.  This 
proposal takes into account inflation and provides a periodic check to increase the 
standards.  Although this proposal will not solve many of the problems with in the 
regulatory scheme, it does seem necessary.  By restricting some of the clients, the 
hedge fund industry may benefit from less litigation since only the most 
sophisticated investors remain. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Hedge funds are a large and important player in America’s financial 
landscape.  Due to the recent surge in the number and influence of hedge funds the 
financial sector has experienced some growing pains.  Specifically, regulatory 
bodies such as the SEC are still figuring out the right balance between a healthy 
environment for hedge funds and protecting investors. 
For over thirty years, the SEC has relied on 13Fs to help strike this balance.  
However, a recent challenge to their validity by hedge fund manager Goldstein 
could throw this balance off.  Goldstein makes two distinct claims: 1) that the 
information contained on the form falls under trade secret protection, and 2) the 
SEC’s actions amount to a regulatory taking. 
Most likely Bulldog will not prevail on a trade secret argument.  Because 
there are three specific instances where Bulldog reveals this information, they are 
not the most ideal plaintiff to advance this argument.  This will actually be 
problematic for most firms since many firms divulge certain aspects of their 
strategies to attract potential customers and retain current ones. 
The courts will not view the incomplete, and sometimes outdated, 
information on a 13F as sufficient enough to satisfy the second prong of harm.  
Two Sigma, a fellow hedge fund, made a similar argument similar to Bulldog’s in 
2005 which was shot down since they could not prove specific ways to reverse 
engineer from 13F forms.400  Since 13F has been around for over thirty years, 
firms should be able to prove specific instances where they were harmed.  Until 
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they can actually point to such instances, 13Fs will remain in play for their 
information gathering uses and due diligence. 
The second argument is a takings argument, which will be quite difficult for 
hedge funds to prove.  Firms need to look no further than the first analysis, 
threshold questions, to encounter problems.  Hedge funds need to convince courts 
that their strategies are in fact “property” as intended by the Fifth Amendment.401  
The fact that there is no market value to the strategies could be a problem, but 
ultimately courts should be receptive to this argument but not to the point where it 
would be classified as a per se case.402 
Courts will have a tougher time resolving the policy issues since there is no 
precise rubric.  Courts will have to weigh the balance between hedge funds’ 
competitiveness and investors’ knowledge.  Since there is an extensive history of 
protecting investors, and eliminating fraud is crucial to healthy markets, the courts 
will most likely side with the investors. 
There are several important distinctions between this and Goldstein’s first 
lawsuit, which he won.  Since the 2006 case, several hedge funds have collapsed 
and committed fraudulent actions which have raised concerns in Congress.  A 
second distinction is that Goldstein’s case will be subject to stricter scrutiny since 
he is now challenging Congressional legislation as opposed to an agency’s 
interpretation and courts give broader deference to Congressional acts. 
One last difference is that the first case was based on a change in a rule that 
had only existed for a short time; whereas Goldstein’s new case is based on 13(f), 
which has been applied to case law for over thirty years.  13(f) has functioned in an 
acceptable manner as a whole; therefore, to be overturned would require a more 
persuasive argument than the one Goldstein and Two Sigma have advanced to be 
overturned.  Thus, for the foreseeable future it would appear 13Fs are secure. 
Beyond 13(f), there are a number of new disclosure proposals in the pipeline.  
Their promulgation comes from a variety of sources including the SEC, Working 
Group, foreign regulatory agencies and some even from the hedge fund industry 
itself.  Each of these proposals weighs intrusions into the hedge fund environment 
and the associated costs.  These factors are weighed against the added security to 
investors and markets, as well as the ability for agencies to more effectively do 
their jobs. 
Currently, none of these proposals seems ready for implementation outside 
of a few years due to the intense battle of the details to follow any of them.  
However, several of the recommendations have great merit and can serve to 
benefit both investors and the hedge fund industry.  Therefore, it is very likely that 
in the coming years a version of several of these ideas will be put into place.  In the 
end, it seems that new regulations are only a matter of time. 
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